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Abstract
Background: There are few clinical tools that assess decision-making under risk. Tests that characterize sensitivity and bias
in decisions between prospects varying in magnitude and probability of gain may provide insights in conditions with
anomalous reward-related behaviour.
Objective: We designed a simple test of how subjects integrate information about the magnitude and the probability of
reward, which can determine discriminative thresholds and choice bias in decisions under risk.
Design/Methods: Twenty subjects were required to choose between two explicitly described prospects, one with higher
probability but lower magnitude of reward than the other, with the difference in expected value between the two
prospects varying from 3 to 23%.
Results: Subjects showed a mean threshold sensitivity of 43% difference in expected value. Regarding choice bias, there
was a ‘risk premium’ of 38%, indicating a tendency to choose higher probability over higher reward. An analysis using
prospect theory showed that this risk premium is the predicted outcome of hypothesized non-linearities in the subjective
perception of reward value and probability.
Conclusions: This simple test provides a robust measure of discriminative value thresholds and biases in decisions under
risk. Prospect theory can also make predictions about decisions when subjective perception of reward or probability is
anomalous, as may occur in populations with dopaminergic or striatal dysfunction, such as Parkinson’s disease and
schizophrenia.
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Introduction
How humans make decisions is an important question in the
study of human behavior and cognition. The manner in which
options are weighed and different forms of information incorpo-
rated remain poorly understood, as are the systematic biases or
misperceptions that lead to decisions that deviate from rational
behavior. However, progress has been made in the study of
decisions involving risks [1] , and the neural circuitry underlying
the influences of reward on behavior are being elucidated,
particularly in regard to the role of dopaminergic systems and
the basal ganglia [2,3,4]. Ultimately, our understanding of
decision-making in such situations may clarify some important
aspects of cognitive dysfunction in conditions with disorders of
these systems, such as Parkinson’s disease, iatrogenic pathologic
gambling, and schizophrenia [5,6].
While many reports on motivation have examined how reward
modulates responses, resulting for example in faster or more
accurate saccades [7,8,9,10,11], it is also important to understand
how subjects make decisions when choices involve rewards, and
what factors guide those decisions. Decision-making has been
defined by a few key parameters: the likelihood of an outcome
(probability), the size of the outcome (magnitude) and the variance
of the outcomes [12]. The context of the decision-making exercise
is also an important parameter, particularly whether the choice is
presented under ‘risk’, when the probabilities of gains or loss are
explicitly defined, or ‘ambiguity’, when the probabilities of
outcomes are not known to the subject [1,13].
Much research has focused on creating models that examine the
different variables involved in decision-making. However, few of
the tasks used in these studies have been described in terms of their
internal validity with the purpose of developing them for use in the
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assess decisions involving rewards or penalties. The most widely
used is the Iowa Gambling Task [14,15]. On this test, subjects
begin without knowledge of the probabilities of gains or losses
involved and must discover these on their own over the course of
the test – hence it assesses decisions under ambiguity and subsequent
learning. While the Iowa Gambling Task has had success
predicting naturalistic risk-taking behaviours, others have pointed
out that this test does not lend itself well to decomposition - that is,
the isolation of the specific cognitive components involved: i.e. ‘‘it
is almost impossible to determine the degree to which individual
differences in behavior in the Iowa Gambling Task reflect
differences in learning, risk attitudes, and/or sensitivity to gain
and/or loss magnitude’’ (p. 14) [16]. Similar criticisms have been
levied against the Balloon Analogue Risk Task [17]. As a
consequence, there is a need for new experimental paradigms
that have external validity for natural behaviour, are emotionally
engaging, and can decompose performance into variables related
to risk-taking [16].
In this experiment, our main goal was to create a simple
economic scenario to model decision-making under risk. It is not
clear whether risk and ambiguity lie at two extremes of a
continuum or whether they involve distinct neural processes
[13,18,19]. Given the latter possibility, a clinical test of decision-
making under risk may be a useful complement to evaluations
of decision-making under ambiguity. In addition, one advantage
of tests of decision-making under risk is that the use of
explicitly defined probabilities allows for mathematical decompo-
sition of the decision-making process into its different cognitive
constructs.
Our paradigm required subjects to choose between two
prospects differing in the size and probability of reward, to
maximize their financial gain. On each trial we varied the
difference in value of the two prospects to create a spectrum of
choices. We then analyzed the decisions of subjects in this two-
alternative forced-choice paradigm by using traditional concepts
from the field of psychophysics to determine two key summary
variables: the discriminative threshold, which reflects the differ-
ence in value between the two prospects that is required to
cause subjects to choose one prospect reliably more than the other,
and the choice bias, which is the difference in value at which a
subject is equally likely to choose either prospect. Choice bias may
be an important clinical parameter, as it can show whether
behaviour is risk-averse or risk-seeking, by revealing whether
subjects are more likely to choose the high-probability but low-
yield prospect or the low-probability but high-yield one. Thus we
anticipate that such summary variables may prove to be useful
characterizations of group performance in future studies of clinical
populations.
Our initial analyses used the framework of expected value theory,
which posits that subjects decide rationally by computing
the objective worth of the prospects, expected value being the
product of reward magnitude times reward probability. However,
although many studies use expected value to characterize
prospects [7,20,21], human decisions are not always marked
by rationality. A second goal of our work was to evaluate
our results using prospect theory, which holds that decisions are
made on the basis of perceived value rather than objective
worth, and that perceived magnitude and perceived probability
of reward have non-linear relationships with their objective
counterparts [22]. Our results show that some of the irrational
anomalies we discovered using expected value terms can be
explained by the non-linear functions developed by others using
prospect theory.
Materials and Methods
Subjects
Nineteen subjects (10 female, 9 male; 28–45 years of age, all
right-handed) participated, all healthy with no prior psychiatric or
neurological illness, not on medication other than the oral
contraceptive, and with normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Subjects were surveyed for their caffeine intake (mean 1.0 cups,
s.d. 1.1) and the number of hours of sleep obtained the previous
night (mean 6.9 h, s.d. 1.2). Subjects were also screened for
pathological gambling using the South Oaks Gambling Screen
[23] and none were found to be gamblers (mean score 0.53, s.d.
1.01).
Ethics
The institutional review boards of Vancouver General Hospital
and the University of British Columbia approved the protocol, and
all subjects gave written informed consent in accordance with the
declaration of Helsinki. Subjects were paid $10.00 for participa-
tion and received additional payment for rewards gained during
the experiment ($0.20 per coin won), with payments ranging from
$36.40 to 56.20.
Apparatus and protocol
Subjects sat in dim illumination 57 cm away from 220 CRT
screen, with their head position maintained by a chin-rest and
viewing with both eyes. Screen resolution was 1024 by 768 pixels,
which covered 39u and 30u of visual field, respectively. Eye
movements were recorded by a video-based system using the pupil
and the corneal infrared-light reflex to estimate gaze position
(Eyelink 1000 from SR Research Ltd, Mississauga, Canada).
Stimuli, trials and experimental blocks were created using SR
Research Experiment Builder 1.1.2.
Our strategy was to have subjects choose between two
prospects, one on the left and one on the right side of the screen,
each of which had a certain magnitude and probability of reward,
differing from each other and differing from trial to trial. At the
beginning of the experiment, subjects were instructed that the task
was similar to a game show in which they were to maximize their
gain by choosing between two ‘mystery boxes’. Each trial (Figure 1)
began with a 1-second view of a white screen with a dark fixation
cross at screen center. This was followed by an information screen
that showed the reward magnitude and probability for the
prospect on the right and that for the prospect on the left. This
remained visible for 4 seconds, during which time subjects were
free to move their gaze as they deliberated on their choice. After
4 seconds the information screen was replaced by another central
fixation cross, and after subjects had achieved fixation within 4u of
the center, this screen was followed by a display showing two
boxes, which were squares of 8u width, one centered 6u left of
fixation and the other centered 6u right of fixation, each with a
fixation cross at the center of the square. Subjects were instructed
to make a saccade to the centre of the box corresponding to their
choice. (Our experimental paradigm yielded similar data when a
manual response was used instead in an older cohort – see
Appendix S2). If no saccade was performed into one of the choice
boxes within 4 seconds, then the trial was terminated and recycled
to reappear later during the experiment. If a response into a choice
box was made, the computer used the probability and magnitude
information of the choice made by the subject to determine if they
received a reward or not. This information was conveyed to the
subject by a feedback screen with a message stating ‘‘Sorry! Better
luck next time’’ if no reward was given or ‘‘You just won x coins’’ if
they won the gain at stake. After 1.5 seconds this disappeared and
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not required to learn any contingencies during the task, we
attempted to minimize any learning effect induced by providing
trial-by-trail feedback by explicitly telling subjects prior to starting
the experiment that the probabilities depicted were, in fact, true
probabilities and that their decision on one trial would not affect
the outcome on a subsequent trial.
A rational decision-maker would calculate expected value (EV),
which is simply the magnitude of reward multiplied by the
probability of reward, and choose the prospect with the higher
expected value. In humans, though, there is some stochastic
variability in choice [24], and how this is reflected in discrimina-
tive sensitivity to expected value is one of the goals of this study.
Thus the key factor in each trial is the balance between the
expected value of one prospect versus that of the other. In our
experimental conditions, we required subjects to trade off between
one prospect with higher reward probability (which we arbitrarily
designated as Prospect 1) and a second prospect with higher
reward magnitude (Prospect 2). We expressed the difference in
expected value (EV) between the two prospects as (EV1–EV2)/
[(EV1+EV2)/2], which we called the EV-ratio. By our arbitrary
convention a positive EV-ratio indicates that the more favorable
prospect is the one with higher reward probability, whereas a
negative EV-ratio indicates that a rational subject should choose
the prospect with the larger size of reward. We created 14 different
combinations, with the sizes of EV-ratio ranged from 10%, a
difficult discrimination in which the odds are 1.11:1, to 90%, an
easy discrimination corresponding to odds of 2.7:1 (Table 1).
We also added 3 control combinations in which a) one prospect
had both greater magnitude and greater probability of reward
than the other, b) probability differed between the two but
magnitude was equal, or c) magnitude differed but probability was
equal (Table). In these control trials it is obvious which prospect is
the better choice, as there is no need to trade off probability
against magnitude. Control trials verified that subjects understood
the task and were attempting to maximize gain.
As each information screen has to convey simultaneously the
magnitude and probability of reward at risk, to avoid confusion we
depicted one pictorially and the other numerically. Two versions
of the experiment were created. In the first, reward magnitude was
depicted as a stack of one to five rectangular tokens, with each
token worth $0.20, and reward probability by a percentage
number (20 to 80). In the second, reward magnitude was
represented by a number and reward probability by a stack of
two to eight rectangles, to indicate probabilities ranging from 20 to
80%. Ten subjects were assigned to the first version and ten to the
second.
The experiment consisted of 5 blocks separated by a rest break.
Each block consisted of the same set of 34 trials. Each of the 17
different trials (14 experimental combinations and 3 control
combinations) was shown twice in a block, once with the higher
expected value on the right and once with it on the left. The order
of the trials was randomized within each block. At the end of each
block subjects were told how much money they had won. After the
end of the experiment, subjects were paid the gains they had
accrued.
Figure 1. Two examples of trial sequences. Each panel shows a screen display, with the series of screens in a trial progressing from top left to
bottom right. A). First version. A cross at screen center appears, which the subject must fixate first. The next screen is an information screen showing
the outcomes of the left and the right prospects. Here probability is represented as a number (in this example, 30% chance of reward on the left, 70%
chance on the right) and magnitude of reward is shown pictorially (4 tokens on the left, 3 tokens on the right, each token worth $0.20). After 4 sec,
this is replaced by another central cross, once subjects fixate this, a choice screen appears for up to 4 sec, and subjects make a saccade into one of
the boxes to indicate their choice. The computer then determines with the probability of the prospect chosen whether the subject gets a reward. In
this example the subject received 3 tokens. This is then replaced by the fixation cross for the next trial. B). Second version. This is similar except that
probability is represented pictorially (3 rectangles for 30% versus 7 for 70%) and magnitude numerically (5 tokens on the left, 3 tokens on the right).
In this example, the subject did not get a reward.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033460.g001
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The main variable was the choice made by the subject, which
we operationalized as the frequency of choosing the prospect
with higher probability. This was plotted as a function of the
EV-ratio. We first analyzed choice with repeated-measures
ANOVA with main factors of EV-ratio and experiment version
(pictorial magnitude/numerical probability, numerical magni-
tude/pictorial probability), and subject as a random effect.
Second, we fit curves to the data, using least-squares linear
regression of normalized (z-transformed) frequency-of-response
data [25]. This was done for individual subject data for statistical
purposes, and on average group data for illustrative purposes in
Figure 2. From these curves we first obtained the point of
equivalence for each subject, the EV-ratio at which a subject is
equally likely to choose either prospect (i.e. 50% likelihood of
choosing the side with higher probability). We then tested the
hypothesis that the point of equivalence was significantly different
from an EV-ratio of zero, which would indicate a systematic bias
in choice. Second, we obtained estimates for the EV-ratios at
which subjects had a 25% and a 75% likelihood of choosing the
side with higher probability. Half of the difference between these
two EV-ratios is equivalent to a 75% discriminative threshold for
choice, or ‘just noticeable difference’ in EV-ratio, which is midway
between random guessing (50% likelihood) and certainty (0% or
100% likelihood).
Results
On the 30 control trials, 18 of the 19 subjects reliably chose the
side with higher expected value, with 2 subjects making 2 errors, 3
subjects making 1 error and 13 subjects making no errors. One
subject only chose the correct side 60% of the time, which was no
better than chance. Her data are excluded from the following
analysis, because we cannot be certain that her decisions are
guided by a desire to maximize reward.
In the experimental trials, the ANOVA showed a main effect of
EV-ratio (F(13,221)=65.7, p,.0001), confirming a robust and
consistent effect of EV-ratio on choice. The curve fit to group data
showed a bias towards choosing the side with higher probability
rather than higher reward (Figure 2A). The point of equivalence
for these group-averaged data occurred at an EV-ratio of 20.25.
Analyzing the individual subject data, the mean point of
equivalence was 20.38 (s.d. 0.67), which was significantly different
from an EV-ratio of 0 (t(18)=2.40, p,.028), with 95% confidence
interval of [20.71, 20.05]. Thus, the side with greater reward had
to have a 38% larger expected value than the side with higher
probability for subjects to be indifferent in their decision. This
indicates a statistically significant degree of risk aversion in this
group of subjects.
There was an interaction between session and EV-ratio
(F(13,221)=2.05, p,.02). Subjects were more likely to choose
Table 1. Probabilities and magnitudes of reward for the two prospects in each trial, for the 14 experimental conditions and the 3
control conditions.
Experimental Conditions
Reward Magnitude (coins) Reward Probability (%) EV EV EV Ratio
Prospect 1 Prospect 2 Prospect 1 Prospect 2 Prospect 1 Prospect 2
1 4 60 40 0.6 1.6 20.909
1 5 70 30 0.7 1.5 20.727
1 4 70 30 0.7 1.2 20.526
2 5 60 40 1.2 2.0 20.500
1 3 70 30 0.7 0.9 20.250
1 5 80 20 0.8 1.0 20.222
3 5 60 40 1.8 2.0 20.105
3 4 60 40 1.8 1.6 0.117
4 5 60 40 2.4 2.0 0.182
1 3 80 20 0.8 0.6 0.286
2 3 70 30 1.4 0.9 0.435
3 4 70 30 2.1 1.2 0.545
1 2 80 20 0.8 0.4 0.667
2 3 80 20 1.6 0.6 0.909
Control conditions
Reward Magnitude (coins) Reward Probability (%) EV EV EV Ratio
Prospect 1 Prospect 2 Prospect 1 Prospect 2 Prospect 1 Prospect 2
2 4 50 50 1.0 2.0 20.667
3 3 70 30 2.1 0.9 0.800
5 2 60 40 3.0 0.8 1.158
Prospect 1 was arbitrarily designated as having the higher reward probability (EV=expected value=probability X magnitude).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033460.t001
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pictorially and reward probability numerically (Figures 1A, 2B),
with an equivalence point of 20.13, than when the reverse was
true, where the equivalence point was 20.65 (Figures 1B, 2C).
Thus the pictorial symbol has a 26% advantage over Arabic
numbers in biasing choice. The slopes of the curves fitted to the
two sessions did not differ, indicating that sensitivity to expected
value did not differ by which property was indicated pictorially
and which numerically.
For the curve fit to group data, the discriminative threshold for
EV-ratio, was 0.36. Analyzing the individual subject data, the
mean of individual discriminative thresholds was 0.43 (s.d. 0.34),
giving a 95% confidence interval of [0.27, 0.59].
The above analysis in the traditional framework of expected value
theory assumes that subjects have veridical estimates of value and
probability. Prospect theory holds that neither is true, and that
subjective perception of reward magnitude and probability are
non-linear functions. Recent work has summarized much
normative data focused on finding the functions that best fit
human observers and the parameters of the constants of these
functions [26]. To compare our results to predictions from prospect
theory in the literature, we re-plotted our data with the methods in
these reports, which use a logit function to fit curves to the
difference in perceived value V(x,p) (see Appendix S1). Logit
functions give similar results to linear regression of normalized
data [25]. To avoid circularity in the results, we used parameters
for these non-linear functions estimated from an independent
sample of healthy observers in another study, which were also
shown to be comparable to the results from a substantial number
of other reports from healthy subjects [26].
One of the byproducts of these non-linear functions is that the
predicted point of equivalence for perceived value, a subjective
judgment, does not coincide with the point of equivalence for
(objective) expected value, but rather occurs to its left. Figure 3
shows that when we re-plotted our data in terms of the difference
in perceived value, using logit functions, these curves now pass
close to zero. Hence, prospect theory can explain why subjects tend to
favour prospects with higher probability over prospects with larger
rewards, as seen in Figure 2.
Discussion
Our paradigm examined decision-making under risk by
requiring subjects to select between one prospect with higher
probability of gain and another with higher magnitude of gain.
First, we found that a change of 43% in the expected value ratio
was required to shift responses from the point of equanimity,
where subjects were equally likely to choose either option, to a
75% likelihood of selecting the prospect with higher expected
value: this can be considered a ‘‘value-threshold’’ for decision-
making. Second, our results showed a choice bias: the point of
equanimity occurred not when both prospects had equal expected
value, but when the prospect with the higher magnitude of gain
had 38% more expected value than the prospect with higher
Figure 2. Results. The frequency of choosing Prospect 1 (the prospect with higher reward probability) is plotted as a function of the EV-ratio for
(graph A) all subjects, (graph B) subjects in Version 1, in which probability is represented numerically – see Figure 1A, and (graph C) subjects in
Version 2 in which probability is represented pictorially – see Figure 1B. EV-ratio.0 indicates that Prospect 1 with the higher reward probability also
has the higher EV-ratio; EV-ratio,0 indicates that Prospect 2 with the larger reward is the better choice. The point of equivalence (when frequency of
choosing higher probability is equal to frequency of choosing larger reward, i.e. the dotted horizontal line showing frequency=0.5) should occur
when the EV-ratio=0 (dotted vertical line) in a rational decision-maker, but this is shifted in our subjects to the left, indicating greater tendency to
choose Prospect 1, which has the higher reward probability. This is more so in Version 2 than Version 1 (graph A vs. B), indicating that there is an
additional bias in favour of the property depicted pictorially. In (A), the solid grey lines indicate thresholds for 25% and 75% frequency of choice: half
the distance on the x-axis covered by the fitted curve between these two frequencies is taken as our discriminative threshold. Error bars are one
standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033460.g002
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choose the ‘safer’ (i.e. higher probability) prospect, which was
outweighed only when the less likely proposition had an expected
value of 38% or more than that of the safer prospect.
A number of studies have used a similar paradigm that requires
subjects to choose between prospects varying in probability and
magnitude of reward. This has been done to compare the validity
of different decision-making models [27], to derive parameters for
fitting and evaluating different functions in prospect theory (see [26]
for review), to compare the predictions of prospect theory using
different levels of incentives [28], or to examine effects that occur
at the stage of input and selection [26,29]. Others have used this
type of experimental design to investigate the correlates of the
different choice variables with neuroimaging. For example,
functional MRI studies have suggested that there are distinct
neural representations for the value of a prospect and for its
uncertainty [19,20], as well as an aggregate signal that encodes
both [30]. Different regions are activated depending on whether a
subject is making a decision under ambiguity or under risk [18],
though the value of a reward is represented by a common signal in
both cases [13]. Other studies have found a neural correlate for
subjective risk - that is, the degree of risk-aversion [12]. Distinct
neural substrates for different decision-making factors has also
been shown with sequential choice versions [31], and in
understanding the ‘exploration-exploitation’ dilemma relevant to
learning [32,33].
Thus, our simple experimental design has an extensive history
and acceptance as a valid and valuable method of exploring
decisions under risk. Our results show that this type of paradigm
can also be used to behaviourally characterize and quantify
sensitivity and bias in choice in a sample of human subjects.
Sensitivity and bias are common summary variables in studies of
perceptual processing: here we show that they may also be useful
measures of a cognitive evaluation of risk, and potentially
applicable to the study of decision-making in clinical populations.
In our group of unselected healthy young subjects, our parameters
were fairly robust and consistent across subjects, with 95%
confidence intervals of [0.27, 0.59] for discriminative threshold
and [20.71, 20.05]. for decision bias. Hence it should be feasible
to employ this design to study disordered patient groups.
Our chief goal was to characterize human decisions under risk
as a function of the objective values of choices presented. As such,
this employs the framework of expected value theory, which holds that
the expected value of a choice is the product of the magnitude and
probability of reward for that choice. A thoroughly rational ‘ideal
evaluator’ in this situation would simply select the prospect with
the largest expected value: in place of the sigmoid-shaped curve in
Figures 2 and 3, there would be a step-function at an EV-ratio of
zero: the infinite slope of a step function would correspond to a
discriminative threshold of zero (i.e. an ‘ideal evaluator’ would be
exquisitely sensitive to any change in EV), and its occurrence at an
EV-ratio of zero would indicate no bias toward magnitude or
probability in the decision, in other words, a neutral risk attitude
that is neither avoiding nor seeking risk. Our finding that the
discriminative threshold is 43% - i.e. that there is a sigmoid-shaped
curve - reflects limits in our subjects’ ability to estimate small
differences in expected value, which in some models is represented
as deriving from a stochastic choice variable [24]. The existence of
a choice bias showing a risk-premium of 38% of expected value
indicates that human behaviour deviates from an ideal evaluation
of the objective value of prospects and is not risk-neutral but
rather, risk-averse.
Figure 3. Results plotted in prospect theory terms. The frequency of choosing Prospect 1 is plotted as function of the difference in perceived
value (V(x,p), see Appendix S1) rather than objective value, for all subjects (graph A), subjects in Version 1 (graph B), and subjects in Version 2 (graph
C). Values greater than zero indicate that Prospect 1, with the higher reward probability, has the greater perceived value. Compared to Figure 2, the
fitted logit function for all subjects now passes through the line of equivalence (frequency=0.5) close to where V(x,p)=0. This is because V(x,p)=0 at
a negative value of EV-ratio, due to the non-linearites in perceived utility and perceived probability (see Appendix S1, Image I-right graph). Error bars
are one standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033460.g003
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model, in part because of its simplicity. Experiments performed in
primates largely base their analysis of reward processing on its
predictions [4,8,34], it is used to model probabilistic decision-
making in human behavioral studies [7,9,35,36] and human
imaging work [20,21] and it forms the implied basis of the widely
used Iowa gambling task [14]. However, the fact that humans
deviate from rationality in decision-making under risk has been
known for some time, and was the impetus for the development of
models superseding expected-value theory. Two limitations of
expected-value theory have been highlighted in particular. First, it
does not take into account the utility of the outcome or the effect of
decreasing marginal sensitivity. That is, it assumes that all subjects
value outcomes (gains or losses) uniformly, irrespective of factors
like their pre-existing wealth or the gains already accumulated: for
example, a gain of $1000 is probably more meaningful to someone
with nothing than to someone who has already won $1,000,000.
Expected utility theory corrected this with a non-linear utility function
for outcomes [26,37]. The second limitation of expected value theory is
that individual risk-aversion or risk-seeking tendencies may affect
how subjects weigh probability information in their decision: mean
variance theory handles this by weighting the payoff by their
susceptibility to risk [38]. Prospect theory is the most recent model
and it uses a different, more integrated approach to risk behaviour
to address these limitations [22,39]. The basic tenet of prospect theory
is that subjects evaluate choice not on the basis of objective
estimates of expected value, but by their subjective perception of
value, which has inherent systematic biases. The perception of
reward magnitude is characterized by an exponential function in
which increments in reward are valued more at low than at high
levels of reward (thus the difference between four and five dollars is
less meaningful than the difference between one and two dollars).
The perception of probability is characterized by a non-linear S-
shaped weighting function that adjusts for our tendency to
overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities.
Such adjustments were motivated by anomalous human behaviour
at these extremes, as manifest in decisions to buy insurance against
low-probability losses or to buy lottery tickets for low-probability
wins, for example [40]. Individual risk behaviour thus depends on
both the probability weighting function and the non-linearity of
the utility function [41] such that, according to prospect theory,
people tend to be risk-averse for high probability gains and risk-
seeking for low probability gains [39]. This differs from the mean-
variance approach to decision-making, which takes into account
individual risk susceptibility by adjusting risk (the variance of
outcomes) for an individual’s subjective sense of risk [42].
In our study, the anomalous behavior is the choice bias of 38%,
indicating a tendency to favor a prospect with slightly higher
probability over one with slightly higher reward. This bias can be
viewed as another way of expressing ‘‘risk premium’’. Risk
premium is considered the amount of expected value that subjects
are willing to forego to avoid risk, and is often operationally
defined as the difference in expected value between the gain a
subject is willing to take with 100% certainty and a gamble with
uncertainty [43]. Therefore, if a subject is willing to take $45 with
100% certainty as opposed to a bet for $100 with 50% probability,
the risk premium is $5=$50(0.5)2$45(1.0). This has also been
termed the ‘certainty equivalent’ [22] and has been calculated to
compare risk behaviours across groups [44]. One possible
limitation of this measure is that it is often derived from
hypothetical choices [12] that do not necessarily reflect real
choices with consequences (e.g.. monetary pay-outs) [28]. In our
study, we quantified risk premium as a proportion of the expected
value of the prospect under consideration: as such it is a relative
value and can transfer to other choice currencies. In addition, it
derived from real choices the subjects faced, which confers an
important element of affective engagement, as well as real-life
validity. Risk premium is not explained by expected value theory since
it defies its basic axiom of rationality. However, using indepen-
dently obtained estimates of parameters from other studies of
healthy subjects, we could show that this risk premium is predicted
as the product, not of objective measures of probability and size of
gain, but of subjective measures of perceived probability and
perceived utility of gain. Hence prospect theory may account not only
for irrational human choices at the extremes of the probability
spectrum, but also for anomalous choices with more typically
encountered levels of probability.
An important feature of our experimental design is that the
probabilities and magnitudes of reward associated with each
choice were explicitly provided in each trial. As pointed out, this
created a situation of risk, but importantly, this also eliminated the
need for subjects to learn these parameters. This differs from
several studies assessing behavior as a function of expected value
[7,21] and current clinical paradigms such as the Iowa gambling
task [14,45] and the Balloon Analogue Risk-Taking task [17]. For
example, in the Iowa Gambling Task, subjects choose cards from
one of four decks. There is a gain with every card, which is
identical for all cards in a specific deck; however, the two decks
with the higher gains also have the risk of occasional high losses, so
that in the long run it is more advantageous to select from the
decks with modest gains. Healthy participants quickly discover
that the decks with lower gains are most advantageous, but certain
disease populations fail to do this [46,47,48]. As subjects do not
start with information about the gains and losses of each deck, they
must learn the ‘tortoise-and-hare’ moralistic dimension of this
paradigm over the course of the test. As a result, whether poor
performance on the Iowa gambling task reflects a deficit in
reward-related decision-making or impaired learning remains
contentious [15]. This could be an important confound as patient
populations suspected of having impaired decision-making under
risk may have cognitive dysfunction that also impacts their
learning and/or their reaction to uncertainty.
Given the prominence of the Iowa Gambling Test, it is worth
highlighting other important differences between this test and our
paradigm. There are only two expected values operating in the
Iowa Gambling Test, a higher one for the two decks with lower
gains and a lower one for the two with higher gains. Thus it cannot
quantify the sensitivity of subjects to differences in expected value.
Second, although the decks differ in the probability of losses, the
decks with higher probability of loss have the same expected value
as those with lower probability. Hence the test cannot assess how
subjects incorporate probability information in their decision-
making. In contrast, our paradigm was designed to study how
subjects balance explicit information about the probability of gain
against the magnitude of gain, and by doing so over a range of
values, provides an estimation of the sensitivity of the subject to
expected value.
It has been stated that new tests that specifically examine
decisions under risk are needed to complement the assessment of
how subjects learn loss-aversive strategies in the Iowa Gambling
Task [16]. Also, though widely accepted, prospect theory has seldom
been used as a framework for evaluating decisions in clinical
populations, even in those with established anomalies in reward
processing. For example, patients with Parkinson’s disease have
been shown to be less sensitive to reward (positive feedback) as a
result of their dopamine-depleted state [49,50,51] but become less
sensitive to penalty (negative feedback) when treated with
dopamine agonists [47,52,53]. Dopamine agonist treatment can
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gamblers [54]. Studies using functional MRI have demonstrated
that patients with an impulse control disorder while on dopamine
agonists show both a behavioural bias towards risky choices and
reduced neural activation by risk, compared to controls with
Parkinson’s disease but no impulse control problems [55]. At this
point, however, it is not known whether these patients are
compelled to bet by an altered perception of risk as would be
suggested by the mean-variance approach to risk behaviour [55]
or if their deficit can be attributed to one of the decision-making
variables described by prospect theory: either an inflated perception
of gains or an over-estimation of small probabilities of winning. As
seen in the Appendix S1, prospect theory makes very different
predictions about the effects on discriminative thresholds from
these two different manipulations.
In conclusion, we showed that this simple test provides a robust
measure of discriminative value thresholds and biases in decision-
making under risk, in a design that eliminates confounds of
decisional ambiguity and learning. We show that healthy subjects
show a choice bias that favours probability over magnitude, which
can be explained by non-linearities in the subjective perception of
the value of a choice, as predicted by prospect theory. Prospect theory
makes predictions about the effect of changing parameters in these
non-linear functions, which may generate useful insights when
used to evaluate the decisions under risk of populations with
anomalous reward-processing, such as Parkinson’s disease and
schizophrenia.
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